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Abstract 
 Responding to seemingly intractable levels of long-term 
unemployment and more recently arising from fiscal austerity, many 
countries have re-examined their approach to activating the unemployed. 
This re-examination has altered the role of the public employment 
service from provider to commissioner of services and created quasi-
markets in the delivery of labour market programmes. The purpose of 
this review is to examine the success of these markets and to determine 
if the design of Britain’s Work Programme reflects lessons learned in 
other countries. We conclude that a thorough review of international 
experience and a measure of patience while the Flexible New Deal ran 
its course, would have informed the Programme’s design and 
commissioning model. These flaws, combined with a depressed 
economic climate, will make it impossible for the Programme to 
demonstrate expected levels of additionality in terms of job outcomes.  
JEL: D02, H11, H53, I38, L24  
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Introduction 
Responding to seemingly intractable levels of long-term unemployment and more recently 
arising from fiscal austerity, many countries have re-examined their approach to activating the 
unemployed. This re-examination has challenged traditional models of welfare state delivery, 
altered the role of the public employment service from provider to commissioner of services 
and sought to redefine the rights and obligations of the unemployed themselves. The result of 
this new ‘contractualism’ has been the creation of quasi-markets in the delivery of 
employment services and labour market programmes (Nunn et al., 2009; Sol and Westerveld, 
2005; Finn, 2010). This process of marketisation describes the imposition of market forces on 
public services which have traditionally been delivered and financed by local and central 
government. In 2006 60 percent of employment services provision in the UK was in the 
public sector, with the remainder evenly split between for-profit and non-profit providers. In 
Germany, Poland, Sweden and the Czech Republic however, public institutions were 
responsible for 80 percent of such spending (EC, 2008, p. 37). 
The performance of these quasi-markets in employment services has recently come to fore 
with allegations of fraud against a prime contractor on Britain’s flagship Work Programme. 
The purpose of this review is to examine the success of markets in outsourced employment 
services and to determine if the design of Britain’s Work Programme reflects lessons learned 
elsewhere. 
The ‘Proper’ Scope of Government?  
Welfare reform in the UK has proceeded apace since the election of a Conservative-Liberal 
Democrat coalition government in 2010. Elected on a mandate of fiscal responsibility, 
localism and of championing ‘big society’ (best understood as the antonym of ‘big 
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government’), their intentions for reform of the public services were recently outlined in the 
following White Paper on Open Public Services: 
“To improve quality for all, and particularly for the most vulnerable, we are 
determined to open up the provision of the public services and target funding at the 
most disadvantaged... Improvements will be driven by putting the needs of citizens 
before producer interest, by using data transparency to put real information in 
people’s hands, and by decentralising power to ensure that public service providers 
are accountable to the people that use them rather than to centralised 
bureaucracies... This means replacing top-down monopolies with open networks in 
which diverse and innovative providers compete to provide the best and most 
efficient services for the public.” (HM Government, 2012, p. 3)  
Oliver Hart et al. (1997) explored the issue of when government should provide a service 
in-house and when should provision be contracted-out. To proponents, contracting out 
enables the delivery of public services at lower cost (Savas, 1982; Logan, 1990), while critics 
assert that the quality of contracted-out services is often inferior to that delivered by public 
employees (Shichor, 1995). 
The traditional approach within economics to the contracting out of public services 
usually dealt with issues of moral hazard, the form of competition in newly created markets 
and of information incompleteness between contracting parties (Laffont and Tirole, 1993; 
Tirole, 1994; Vickers and Yarrow, 1988; Schmidt, 1996; Shapiro and Willig, 1990). In the 
context of employment services, Koning et al. (2007) describes scenarios where the profit 
motive introduces moral hazard wherein a contractor knows the quality of its service is 
difficult to observe, where a large degree of information asymmetry exists between providers 
and their clients (who may participate on credence, or by mandatory referral) and where the 
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assessment of a provider’s true additionality is confounded by external factors such as the 
business cycle or simply demand for labour.  
While the problems of incomplete and asymmetric information are possibly endemic in 
agency, Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991, 1994) demonstrate that providing an agent with 
incentives to achieve a specific outcome is likely to result in the shirking of other – mandated 
but unrewarded – outcomes such as quality. This insight is critical as it speaks to the ability of 
open services initiatives to deliver improvements in service quality over and above that 
pertaining to direct provision. 
Hart et al. (1997) hold that the cost and benefits of contracting out hinge on the 
assumption of contractual incompleteness given that the quality of service desired by a 
principal is often difficult to fully specify. In the context of labour market programmes a 
measure of political ambiguity tends exist around the justification for any intervention in the 
labour market. For instance, a socially benevolent programme may invest in training the 
unemployed to achieve a human capital outcome at the individual level; a less expensive 
programme might concentrate solely on matching candidates to vacancies and promote a 
‘work first’ ethos. The end-to-end delivery of human capital type schemes is likely to be more 
difficult to contract as it would involve mandating training quality (and learning outcomes) 
over a wide spectrum of courses. On the other hand a ‘work first’ programme that places 
employment outcomes before job-match quality or sustainability of employment, carries less 
risk of contractual incompleteness as the desired level of service (i.e. immediate employment) 
is easily observed. 
Hart et al. (1997, p. 1129) remark that, “a private contractor generally has a stronger 
incentive both to improve quality and to reduce costs ... but [their] incentive to engage in cost 
reduction is typically too strong since [it] ignores the adverse impact on quality.” This 
observation is acutely relevant for a labour market intervention purporting to offer tailored 
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support to the unemployed, as the quality of this support will be closely tied to overall costs. 
They conclude, “in general, the bigger the adverse consequences of (noncontractible) cost 
cutting on (noncontractible) quality, the stronger is the case for in-house provision.” 
Experiences of Contracting-Out of Employment Services 
Finn (2011) reviewed the literature on employment services subcontracting in reform-minded 
European countries including the United States, Australia, Britain, Germany, and the 
Netherlands. He focussed on the development and characteristics of subcontracting 
relationships, the types of activities they deliver and the impact on employment outcomes. His 
findings suggest that private providers can, “under certain contractual arrangements, improve 
outcomes for particular groups and bring innovation to service delivery. The competitive 
pressure they bring may also prompt improved PES performance.” His findings are very 
much at odds with Hart et al. (1997) who maintain that the incentives arising from residual 
control rights (behaviour in uncontracted scenarios) are more important than any benefits 
arising from competition.
1
  
While the US Job Training Partnership Act of 1984 is usually cited as the first major 
example of performance-related contracting in employment services, the UK’s experience 
may also be traced to the Training and Enterprise Councils of 1987. These private sector 
bodies delivered a range of training and employment programmes with a portion their funding 
dependent not solely on job outcomes but on qualifications obtained during participation 
(Bennett et al., 1994). New Labour continued the reform agenda by testing a number of 
outcomes-based contracts including Employment Zones (targeting the long-term unemployed) 
                                                 
1
 Hart et al. (1997) were writing in the context of proposed privatisation of prisons in the 
United States. 
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and Pathways (targeting those in receipt of disability benefits
2
. While the zone model was 
found to have “somewhat” better outcomes than other New Deal programmes, Pathways 
largely failed to secure job outcomes and thus contracts fell into jeopardy as revenue streams 
did not materialise. According to NAO (2010, p. 27), Pathways suffered from a poorly 
designed procurement process which had encouraged providers to over-commit, resulting in 
more conservative but realistic bids being written-off as outliers. 
Since introducing a fully privatised market in employment services in 1998, Australia 
have worked on several iterations of their Job Network programme to improve its efficiency 
and adjust incentives for providers. While initial contracts adopted a ‘black box’ approach 
entailing large amounts of autonomy and the concentration of revenue in outcome-based 
payments, by its fourth iteration Job Services Assistance included access to a pathway fund 
encouraging providers to personalise services and the training needs of their clients. Arising 
from many controversies over gaming of the system, other adjustments to the Australian 
model have included: ring fencing of funds for services to job-seekers; loading performance 
measures toward outcomes for the most disadvantaged; capturing service quality as a key 
performance indicator; and intervening to review contracts where allegations of parking have 
been made (Finn, 2010, p. 295). 
The Dutch social insurance agency, UWV, began contracting-out employment services in 
2003. Reviews have shown that while their move from partial to full outcome payments did 
succeed in raising overall job placement rates, no effect was observed for harder-to-help 
clients including those transitioning from disability benefits (Koning and Heinrich, 2010). 
That many of these additional jobs lasted for less than a year indicates job-seekers may have 
been placed in poorly matched, unsustainable or even bogus employment. To overcome 
criticisms of standardised or generic trajectories employed by contractors, greater 
                                                 
2
 Multiple evaluations of each scheme are published on the National Audit Office website, 
http://nao.gov.uk 
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personalisation of treatment has been enabled by the introduction of individual budgets – 
equipping clients with greater power to negotiate their re-integration paths with case 
managers. More recently some Dutch local authorities have brought case management and 
initial assessment back in-house. While re-integration services are still contracted out, local 
authorities have come to favour a ‘modular’ commissioning strategy over end-to-end 
contracts as the former are easier to monitor and measure (Plantinga et al., 2011). 
Arising from a Commission led by Peter Hartz, Germany began a process of modernising 
labour regulations and reforming their public employment service, Bundesagentur für Arbeit 
(BA), over a decade ago. Among the changes to employment services have been the 
introduction of benefit sanctions for poor job-search or job avoidance and greater private 
sector contestability in service delivery. Following legal changes in 2003, local BA offices 
were obliged to follow public procurement rules when letting employment service contracts. 
According to Schneider (2008), BA responded to this by centralising contracting and 
controlling costs by emphasising price competition. However, the unforeseen consequences of 
centralisation and efficiency targets were a reduction in the number of local providers, the 
emergence of supra-regional providers and an actual decline in competition. Notwithstanding 
this, the UK Work Programme has adopted a centralised system of large-scale and high-value 
contracting. 
Finn (2011, p. 5) proposes a number of lessons from his review of international best 
practice:  
1. Implementing an effective contracting system is a developmental process and requires 
an iterative process of monitoring, evaluation and modification.  
2. Selection processes that have given too much weight to the lowest priced bids have 
resulted in poor or unviable contracts.  
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3. Contracting requires comprehensive IT systems that enable contracting authorities to 
track participants, monitor provider performance and to verify the quality of service and 
delivery of outcomes.  
4. Contracting agencies need to independently monitor customer experiences and ensure 
that robust systems are in place to deal with complaints of poor service delivery (e.g. 
parking).  
5. Contracting large and complex systems involves a steep learning curve and it takes time 
to steer the system to minimise perverse incentives and to capture the efficiencies and 
innovation that contractors may offer.  
Britain’s New Work Programme 
The current Work Programme owes its genesis to a commissioning strategy document 
published by the Department for Work & Pensions (DWP) in 2008, also under New Labour. 
The strategy, which responded to recommendations from the Freud Report and closely echoed 
Hartz reforms in Germany, explicitly aimed to marketise the provision of employment 
services by letting comprehensive, end-to-end contracts to a small number of ‘prime’ 
providers. Outlining their vision, DWP (2010) proposed that by 2011 the public service would 
handle benefit administration and early job-matching while more intensive assistance would 
be managed by prime contractors. 
The Work Programme is an integrated workfare programme implemented in England, 
Scotland and Wales in June of 2011. It replaced around 20 pre-existing schemes, each 
operating under different delivery models, outcome definitions, and contracting and incentive 
structures (e.g. Employment Zones, Flexible New Deal, New Deal and Pathways to Work).
3
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 The remainder of this section largely follows NAO (2012a). 
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The department has contracted eighteen prime providers to manage employment services 
in forty contract areas. The ‘primes’ may choose to operate services directly or to subcontract 
to an end-to-end agent who in turn may engage various specialist/spot contractors to fulfil 
specific training etc. In total there 785 separate organisations
4
 involved in the Work 
Programme’s diffuse supply chain. 
Job Centre Plus refers a claimant to a prime contractor after handling their initial job 
search. Referrals are mandatory for those in receipt of Jobseekers Allowance (JSA) and 
prison-leavers, although more complicated referral criteria apply to those in receipt of 
Incapacity Benefits and Employment Support Allowance. Claimants are classified into one of 
nine groups depending on their perceived readiness to work, with prime providers receiving 
differential outcome payments based on the ‘difficulty’ of returning members of each group 
to work. The total payment for returning a job-seeker aged 18-24 to employment is £3,810, 
while larger payments of £13,720 attach to more difficult cases (i.e. those formerly in receipt 
of Incapacity Benefit and now transitioned to Employment Support Allowance).  
Payments are made to providers under a payment-by-results regime and in a series of 
stages; each stage reflects the achievement of job outcome successes. Thus:  
Attachment Payment: for taking a claimant on to the Programme. The attachment fee 
reduces to nil by the start of the fourth year.  
Job Outcome Payment: When a claimant has been in work for either a continuous or 
cumulative period of employment.  
Outcome Sustainment Payment: A further payment every four weeks for keeping a 
claimant in employment.  
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 This figure was correct as of July 2012. See http://www.dwp.gov.uk/docs/wp-supply-
chains.xls for updates. 
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Incentive Payment: For jobs delivered beyond a given performance level – defined by 
DWP as 30 per cent above non-intervention levels.  
Early Reviews of the Work Programme 
Commissioned by the Department for Work & Pensions (DWP), Newton et al. (2012) 
presented preliminary findings based on qualitative research forming part of the official 
evaluation of the Work Programme’s first year in operation. They sampled six of the eighteen 
Contract Package Areas, interviewing staff and customers and observing frontline contact 
between providers and customers.
5
  
Referring to the random allocation of customers to prime providers within a contract area, 
DWP staff acknowledged that while randomisation prevented selection based on a customer’s 
profile (known as ‘creaming’) it prevented DWP staff from making referrals in the customer’s 
best interest. For example, where a particular provider would have been preferred based on 
their experience of meeting specialist needs, their proximity to a customer’s home or taking 
into account travel arrangements for rural dwellers. 
Despite having the flexibility to tailor delivery by engaging specialist or spot contractors, 
the report finds that use of specialists varied widely and that this variation reflected attempts 
to control cost. Specialist subcontractors were typically engaged to deal with employability 
training, sector-specific training, work placement, vacancy searching health management and 
addiction counselling. Concern for targets and finance was found to come before participant 
needs in at least one of the provider interviews conducted. In cases where specialist 
subcontractors were engaged, the process of providing feedback to main providers was varied 
                                                 
5
 The authors caution that care should be exercised in generalising their findings as the 
research is qualitative in nature and conducted at an early stage of the Work Programme. 
In all, several waves of research are being undertaken, employing a mix of cross-sectional 
and longitudinal designs. A subsequent report examining the programme’s 
commissioning model is expected later in 2013. 
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and ranged from regular updates to no contact at all. While specialist contractors worked 
particularly well for specific groups of participants (e.g. new mothers returning to the labour 
force after childbirth), occasional relationship difficulties including underperformance and 
excessive cost did arise. Some spot providers, contracted by primes or their end-to-end agents, 
reported having no budget for specialist training and were instead focussing their help on job 
ready customers (known as ‘skimming’). 
Newton et al. (2012) note that the discretion (‘black box’ approach) afforded to primes in 
how they manage contracts with end-to-end and spot providers, contributed to variation in the 
extent to which selective outcomes for job ready customers were promoted over more 
complex cases who may be furthest from the labour market (known as ‘parking’). In some 
cases, subcontracted staff had a lack of knowledge of the minimum delivery standards 
committed to by the prime provider. 
The flexibility to provide personalised, tailored support has been vaunted as a core 
innovation of the Work Programme model. Referring to personalisation, Newton et al. (2012) 
find evidence of procedural – though not of substantive – personalisation in programme 
delivery. They report that providers’ initial assessments of customers varied in depth and 
quality, as did their technique of assessing job readiness. The report notes that action plans 
agreed during initial assessments were sometimes computer-generated or generic in nature, 
and that referrals to generic training did not always reflect individual needs. The report 
concludes that personalisation amounted to streaming at group level and to variation in the 
frequency of advisor meetings at the individual level. The report finds that in practice, job 
ready customers were more likely to receive weekly meetings with a personal advisor while 
customers originating from Employment Support Allowance (ESA) were seen at six week 
intervals or counselled over the phone.
6
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 ESA customers were not subject to mandatory referral or benefit sanction. 
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“Meaningful contact is fairly vague. It doesn’t have to be face-to-face or an 
individual appointment, it could be a telephone call or participation in a group 
employability session. We like this, we can be more flexible according to customer 
needs. We don’t need to bring people into the office for the sake of it and it helps 
keep costs down.” (Manager, generalist end-to-end provider, quoted in Newton 
et al. (2012, p. 26))  
Overall the report describes the Programme’s approach as being dominated by a ‘work 
first’ ethos with limited focus on developing customer’s human capital or employability. It 
cites examples of customers who were sent forward to interviews lacking basic certification in 
the relevant industry (e.g. Construction Skills Certificate, security licence, CRB check) in 
anticipation of these costs being met by subsequent employers. In other cases, training 
opportunities were withheld until candidates received a definite job offer. By contrast some 
providers adopted a hybrid model of combining active job search with work- or specific-skills 
training. 
Newton et al. (2012, p. 111) are cautious of making any conclusions in relation to the 
creaming and parking of candidates as none have yet completed the Programme’s full cycle. 
However, they underscore earlier observations that job-ready candidates are seen on a more 
frequent basis by many providers. A potential implication of this bias is that those with high 
or multiple barriers to work may experience a lack of referral to additional support and 
training activities. 
Complementing the work of Newton et al., the National Audit Office (NAO, 2012a) 
conducted an early review of the design and commissioning of the Work Programme. While 
generally supportive of the move to consolidate the number of labour market programmes and 
to address weaknesses in earlier schemes (providing greater flexibility to providers, allowing 
for longer and earlier intervention, offering staged and differentiated payments for different 
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cohorts), they point to weaknesses in the commissioning model arising from hast and 
aggressive assumptions on the part of DWP and prime providers. 
The NAO believes the Programme’s feasibility is underpinned by assumptions about 
likely performance which are unrealistic, given the outcomes achieved on similar programmes 
and the current economic climate. DWP’s expectation of an overall job placement rate of 36 
percent has obvious implications for the viability of business models structured around staged 
payments related to job outcomes. 
Looking at a specific cohort common to both the Work Programme and earlier Flexible 
New Deal (JSA aged 25+), DWP anticipate a placement rate of 40 percent but this cohorts’ 
outcomes were typically half of that (26 percent) under previous programmes. Perhaps more 
sobering is that NAO’s estimate is two percentage points higher than DWP’s counterfactual 
outcome (the job finding rate without intervention) across all cohorts. NAO caution that if 
these optimistic targets and revenue streams are not realised, providers may be encouraged to 
protect their profits by over-looking hard-to-help claimants, reducing service levels and by 
placing disproportionate pressure on subcontractors. 
The NAO is critical of DWP’s use of a common non-intervention counterfactual 
nationwide, as this does not reflect the relative difficulty of achieving national targets in 
contract areas with a higher density of unemployment or greater incidence of long-term 
unemployment. It seems likely that the business models of providers in these high 
unemployment areas will come under most pressure, and that the specific risks identified by 
the NAO are most likely to occur in there also. 
Whereas previous changes to employment services had been designed and tested over a 
four year period, NAO report that ministers “required” DWP to implement the Work 
Programme within twelve months. As a consequence, no business case was prepared until 
after ministers had committed to the Programme, no alternatives were considered, no pilot 
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undertaken, and no time was taken to await the evaluation of existing programmes. A further 
cost of the Programme’s accelerated introduction has been £68 million in termination 
payments due to Flexible New Deal contractors – ten of whom are now prime providers on 
the Work Programme. 
The NAO believes the “unprecedented levels of performance” and high price discounts 
promised by prime contractors increase the risk that they will be tempted to game the contract 
or to seek concessions from DWP. They believe it is likely that providers will attempt to 
recalibrate prices and other conditions during the contract period and that one or more 
providers may get into serious financial difficulties.  
Conclusion 
It seems reasonable that the performance of the Work Programme be judged against the 
putative benefits of letting outcome-based contracts. For Finn (2010), outcome based 
procurement offers the potential for innovation, flexibility and efficiency savings. Similar 
points are made by Pattison (2012) who also cites value for money (VfM) and flexibility in 
contracting, through the avoidance of public procurement rules, as key advantages of 
contracting out employment services. 
Setting aide VfM which will be keenly watched by the National Audit Office in 
subsequent reports, we argue that certain features in the design of the Work Programme 
undermine the potential for other putative benefits to be realised. While subcontracts let by 
prime providers (and their agent’s) are not subject to public procurement rules, evidence from 
Newton et al. (2012) shows this flexibility to engage spot training is hamstrung by restrictive 
(or absent) budgets, cost-saving and a preference for delivering as much as possible in-house. 
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Although the Work Programme is very much in its infancy and a comprehensive 
evaluation of individual outcomes will require many waves of longitudinal data, this review 
of early evaluations provides support for a number of tentative conclusions. 
Firstly, many of the design flaws identified in NAO (2012a) and Newton et al. (2012) 
were foreseeable and should have been spotted in a review of international best practice. 
Notably, Finn (2010, 2011) was commissioned by the European Commission to report on 
sub-contracting in public employment services. The evidence contained in that review was 
collected during the Work Programme’s design phase. 
Secondly, the decision to restrict eligibility to tender for prime provider contracts was 
unjustifiably exclusive. Ostensibly the Framework for the Provision of Employment Related 
Support Services was used to assert that bidders would have the capacity and expertise to 
operate Work Programme contracts. A consequence of this approach has been that smaller 
operators/alliances (with a combined turnover below £20 million) and charitable bodies 
(whose deferred incomes inflated acid test liabilities) were excluded. An additional hurdle 
requiring successful bidders to demonstrate access to working capital of up to £50 million 
spread over several years, clearly favoured large, cash-rich firms. Successful bidders have 
been assured by DWP that future invitations to tender, including any opportunities that may 
arise from a mid-term review of the Work Programme, will only be extended to Framework 
bidders thereby locking-in current inequities.
7
 
Thirdly, as a result of this exclusivity only three of the eighteen prime provider contracts 
were let to public or third sector bodies. In contrast to systems where the public employment 
service was allowed to compete with private providers, the only public sector representation 
                                                 
7
 Response contained in Question and Answer Brief, available at 
http://www.dwp.gov.uk/docs/erss_qa.pdf. 
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among successful prime providers is Newcastle College Group and Working Links
8
. This 
raises a question as to why Job Centre Plus did not also join the preferred bidders Framework 
and compete against prime providers?  
Fourthly, contracts awarded under the Work Programme are without precedent in terms of 
their value and duration. As described in Jones (2012), this was clearly done to facilitate 
innovative budget management. Final outcome payments will not fall due until programme 
completion at which point they may be offset by savings in annual managed expenditure (the 
benefits bill). While attachment and stage payments will be made to providers, their day-to-
day running costs must be met by private working capital. A direct consequence of this 
approach (and Framework conditions relating to size, turnover and working capital) is the 
exclusion of smaller, regional and third sector bodies from the role of prime provider. 
Fifthly, the intentional incompleteness of contracts concerning programme design (the 
“black box”), combined with the absence of adequate monitoring and IT systems in the initial 
year (NAO, 2012a), has invited fraud and hindered the enforcement of agreed ‘minimum 
service standards’ at all tiers. According to NAO (2012b, p. 4) there have been 126 
investigations into alleged fraud in contracted employment services since 2006. They estimate 
the loss to public funds from fraud and abuse in contracted employment schemes amounted to 
over half a million pounds in 2010-11 alone. Prime Provider A4e identified nine possible 
cases of fraud and seven possible cases of improper practice following an internal audit of 
their New Deal contracts in 2009. 
Lastly, the weaker than expected performance of the UK economy since the Programme’s 
launch has led to the undershooting of placement rates and outcome targets. Should the 
excessively optimistic targets proposed by DWP and prime providers undermine a provider’s 
business model, this will in turn accentuate a host of other risks endemic in employment 
                                                 
8
 Working Links is a voluntary body, part-owned by the Shareholders Executive on behalf 
of the Secretary for Work and Pensions. 
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programmes contracted on a payment-by-results basis (e.g. skimming of the most able 
candidates, and the parking of complex cases facing multiple barriers to employment) and 
ultimately of provider exit. 
It might reasonably be concluded that a thorough review of international experience and a 
measure of patience while live programmes ran their course, would have informed the design 
and commissioning of Britain’s Work Programme and avoided large penalty payments to 
incumbents on pre-existing schemes. Given the current economic climate, it will almost 
certainly be impossible for the Work Programme to demonstrate the expected levels of 
additionality in terms of job outcomes. As is so often said in relation to labour market 
programmes, their surest achievement lies in re-ordering the queue of job-seekers – not in 
reducing it. 
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